Judicial responses to the protected confidential communications legislation in Australia by Mendelson, Danuta
Deakin Research Online 
Deakin University’s institutional research repository 
DDeakin Research Online  
Research Online  
This is the authors final peer reviewed version of the item 
published as: 
 
 
 
Mendelson, Danuta 2002, Judicial responses to the protected confidential 
communications legislation in Australia, Journal of law and medicine, vol. 10, no. 1, 
pp. 49-60. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright : 2002, Thomson Legal & Regulatory Ltd. 
 
 
(2002) 10 JLM 49 at 50 
 
Danuta Mendelson  * Judicial responses to the protected 
confidential communications legislation in Australia  
 
 (2002) 10 Journal of Law and Medicine 49 
 
The article examines the background, aims and scope of recent legislation enacted in 
New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia to protect from disclosure in court of 
"confidential communications" generated in the context of counselling persons who 
allege that they were victims of sexual offences. In drafting the "confidential 
communications" legislation, the legislators undertook a difficult task of balancing the 
public interest in therapeutic confidentiality that would encourage victims of sexual 
assaults to report these offences and seek psychological and psychiatric care on the 
one hand, and the public interest in fairness of the trial, which may be prejudiced by 
exclusion of evidence pertinent to the forensic process on the other. In South Australia 
this task was fulfilled with greater success than in New South Wales and Victoria.  
Introduction 
In 1998-1999 New South Wales,1 Victoria2 and South Australia3 enacted legislation 
protecting "confidential communications", generated in the context of counselling 
persons who allege that they were victims of sexual offences, from disclosure in legal 
proceedings.4 The respective statutes received support from the Opposition parties in 
both Chambers of each of the State Parliaments.5 During the parliamentary debates it 
was noted, however, that there were many submissions arguing that the interests of 
complainants, and the counselling process, ought to be subjugated to an accused 
person's right to a fair trial. For example, the Criminal Law Committee of the Law 
Society of South Australia submitted that concerns about victims of sexual assaults 
avoiding counselling, help or psychiatric care for fear that clinical notes containing 
their innermost feelings and thoughts would become subject to disclosure during trial 
were "at best, speculative and probably illusory".6 
 
Parliamentary debates on this issue exemplify the tension that exists between two 
competing public interests: the public interest in the fairness of the trial, which may 
be prejudiced by exclusion of evidence pertinent to the forensic process, and the 
public interest in preserving therapeutic  
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confidentiality. This article examines the most important aspects of protected 
confidential communications legislation and the response of the judiciary to it, as 
evidenced through the cases. To date, there have been a number of cases in New 
South Wales and Victoria directly relating to the statutory sexual assault 
communications privilege. In South Australia, the Court of Appeal discussed in depth 
the statutory public interest immunity protecting certain communications made by 
sexual assault victims (modelled on but different from the common law public interest 
immunity).7 
Balancing of public interests 
Evidence, provided in court by both sides to the litigation in support of their 
respective pleas and allegations, lies at the heart of the adversarial system.8 Principles 
that exclude material pertinent to the forensic process are based upon social values 
that have objectives external to and different from those which underlie common law 
notions of adversarial legal proceedings. With the notable exceptions of legal 
professional privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination,9 most exclusionary 
rules of evidence are creatures of statute.  
 
Many judges are convinced that parties must have access to all documents relating to 
the case in order for justice to be done. They reason that exclusionary rules, which 
allow withholding of evidence that may be relevant, probative and trustworthy, with 
potential to advance the just resolution of disputes, work against the public interest of 
the truth-seeking function of the court.10 Hence the observation of the High Court of 
Australia in Grant v Downs11 that since "privilege … detracts from the fairness of the 
trial by denying a party access to relevant documents", the public interest requires that 
withholding of material relevant to litigation should be rigidly confined within narrow 
limits.12 
The argument based on the public interest in fairness of the trial is weighty but not 
compelling. Not all material relevant to litigation, in the sense that it "increases or 
diminishes the probability of the existence" of the facts in issue, is admitted in trial.13 
For example, relevant material in the form of hearsay, similar fact, and opinion tends 
to be routinely excluded from trial on the grounds that it might "hinder rather than 
facilitate, the pursuit of truth".14 To be credible, the rhetoric of "truth-seeking", 
"pursuit of truth" and "a fair trial" has to include a reference to the values of 
contemporary society, which may or may not regard as "fair" a trial whereby a finding 
of liability or guilt is accompanied by forensically inflicted severe emotional trauma 
on the victim.  
 
Indeed, at least since the 19th century, some judges have questioned the methodology 
of truth-seeking through insistence on disclosure of confidential communications. 
Thus, referring to the legal professional privilege, Knight Bruce VC observed in 1846:  
The discovery and vindication and establishment of truth are main purposes 
certainly of the existence of Courts of Justice; still, for the obtaining of these 
objects, which, however valuable and important, cannot be usefully pursued 
without moderation, cannot be either usefully or creditably pursued unfairly or 
gained by unfair means, not every channel is or ought to be open to them. The 
practical inefficacy of torture is not, I suppose, the most weighty objection to 
that mode of examination … Truth, like all other good things, may be loved 
unwisely – may be pursued too keenly – may cost too much.15 
The above argument can equally apply to other confidential communications. Indeed, 
in 1828 the legislature of New York enacted a patients'  
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privilege, which provided protection to information gained by medical practitioners in 
the course of their professional relationship with patients. The legislation forbade 
licensed medical practitioners to "disclose any information which [they] may have 
acquired in attending any patient, in a professional character, and which information 
was necessary to enable"16 them to prescribe or act for the patient.  
 
The statutory privilege of medical confidentiality was enacted for public interest 
policy reasons, namely, that doctors need full knowledge of facts in order to provide 
appropriate treatment. Such full disclosure may not be forthcoming if medical 
practitioners are compelled to disclose confidential information in court.17 American 
legislators also noted the long-standing ethical tradition of the medical duty of 
confidentiality, which meant that  
during the struggle between legal duty [to disclose] on the one hand, and 
professional honour on the other, the latter, aided by a strong sense of injustice 
and inhumanity of the rule, will, in most cases, furnish a temptation to the 
perversion or concealment of truth, too strong for human resistance.18 
 
By 1881, 20 United States jurisdictions enacted provisions similar to the New York 
statute.19 Presumably persuaded by public policy arguments similar to those put 
forward by law-makers in the United States, in 1857 the Parliament of Victoria 
amended the Evidence Act to provide for the patient's statutory privilege of 
confidentiality in civil proceedings.20 Tasmania21 and the Northern Territory22 are the 
two other Australian jurisdictions that have enacted a statutory privilege in civil 
proceedings. In New Zealand, ss 32 and 33 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 
1980 (NZ), together with s 35 (which gives a court a discretion in any proceedings 
before it to excuse a witness from giving evidence in breach of confidence), 
comprehensively codify the "doctor-and-patient" privilege.23 
 
In jurisdictions that do not recognise the limited patient's privilege of medical 
confidentiality, it has been argued that withholding medical evidence communicated 
in confidence infringes the defendant's right to mount an effective defence against the 
allegations raised against him or her, by having access to materials that might cast 
doubt on the truthfulness, integrity or accuracy of the plaintiff. However, even those 
jurisdictions accept that medical evidence can be withheld from the court under legal 
professional privilege in criminal cases, if the accused who has retained a medical 
practitioner for the purpose of forming an opinion about his or her medical condition, 
decides that the opinion should not be used in the forthcoming trial.24 
 
The asymmetry of common law rights within the evidentiary process, which dates 
back to the 16th century,25 was justified when defendants laboured under procedural 
and social disadvantages. However, there is little justification for the preferential 
treatment of defendants today. In civil cases involving personal injury litigation, 
defendants through their insurance companies generally command much greater 
economic resources than injured plaintiffs, and in criminal cases, the forensic might of 
the Crown has been greatly diminished by funding cutbacks from the state.  
Confidential communications legislation 
In the second part of the 20th century, professionals working with victims of sexual 
assaults raised a concern that fear of embarrassment, humiliation and distress resulting 
from engagement in the court process discouraged  
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victims from reporting sexual offences perpetrated against them and from seeking 
psychiatric or psychological care.26 Even in jurisdictions which adopted it, the 
procedural and jurisdictional scope of the patients' evidentiary privilege was 
considered too narrow to alleviate the problem. In the final quarter of the 20th 
century, all 50 States of the United States and the District of Columbia enacted an 
evidentiary medical and psychotherapist-patient privilege providing for varying 
degrees of statutory protection from disclosure in litigation for communications 
between the victims of sexual assault and their counsellors.27 
 
At federal level in 1996, in Jaffee v Redmond,28 the Supreme Court of the United 
States determined that confidential communications between a licensed 
psychotherapist (including a licensed social worker in the course of psychotherapy)29 
and his or her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from 
court-compelled disclosure. The protection extends to both production in discovery 
and questioning as to the contents of specified confidential communications in a 
deposition.30 
 
In 1997, the Canadian Parliament amended the Criminal Code 1985 (Can)31 to restrict 
the granting of access to confidential records held by third parties requiring the court 
to weigh the competing public interests before ordering that records be produced to 
the court. The checklist of eight factors governing the production to the court included 
such considerations as whether the likely relevance of the undisclosed evidence has 
been demonstrated (11 factors); whether its production was "necessary in the interests 
of justice"; and whether the disclosure would have a "salutary and deleterious" effect 
on the rights of either the accused or the complainant. That same year, the Supreme 
Court of Canada in M(A) v Ryan32 acknowledged a privilege in the case of a 
psychiatrist providing sexual assault counselling. The court ordered limited disclosure 
"to the extent necessary for proper disposition of litigation" involving production of 
documents "potentially relevant to questions of causation and damages".33 
 
In Australia, the content of the legislation restricting or excluding certain kinds of 
otherwise compellable evidence from legal proceedings was informed by two factors. 
The first was the perception that victims of sexual offences may neither report the 
attacks, nor seek help to overcome their consequences, unless there is some assurance 
of confidentiality in relation to communications which form part of a therapeutic 
process.34 The legislatures therefore decided that the public interest in upholding the 
confidentiality of a therapeutic relationship regarding sexual assault should prevail 
over the public interest in the unimpeded "truth-seeking" forensic process. While 
recognising the exclusionary rule of sexual assault confidential communications in the 
context of the forensic process, the wording of each statute varies, and with it the 
nature and the scope of the exclusion.  
 
Secondly, the confidential communications legislation was a response to the practice 
by defence counsel in cases involving allegations of sexual  
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offences to issue subpoenas to obtain access to the counselling records or treatment 
records of the complainant with the aim of searching for inconsistencies in the early 
reports by the victim. This material, when adduced in court to highlight discrepancies 
in complainants' versions of what they said had happened to them, would often be 
used to humiliate and undermine the witness's credibility on the witness stand.35 This 
practice was rampant even though, as the then Attorney-General for Victoria pointed 
out, clinical notes of counsellors are not records of facts,36 but a professional 
interpretation within the context of the counselling process of the patient's emotional 
responses to what had occurred. Judges would often grant access to files in order "to 
facilitate little more than a fishing expedition for the defence".37 Hence, the form of 
legislation was supposed to be shaped by the mischief it had intended to cure, namely, 
the failure by the judiciary to follow proper processes regarding objections to the 
subpoena itself and the production of the documents referred to in the subpoena. Each 
of the three jurisdictions has adopted a different approach to imposing statutory 
restraints on judicial discretion.  
 
The general thrust of confidential communications statutes is similar, insofar as they 
all extend statutory protection to both civil and criminal proceedings.38 At the same 
time, each of the three legislatures has adopted a distinct approach to the definition 
and implementation of the protective measures. In particular, procedural mechanisms 
for admissibility or exclusion of protected communications have a different 
jurisprudential basis in relation to judicial discretion. Elegantly drafted South 
Australian provisions are based on the public interest immunity principle, and provide 
the most comprehensive protection. In Victoria, the legislature opted for a statutory 
privilege. New South Wales has two rather convoluted statutes governing the sexual 
assault communications privilege, the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), both of which provide different kinds of limited 
protection from admissibility of protected confidences.  
Victoria 
Procedural scope of the legislation 
The Victorian Parliament cast the legislation in terms of a "confidential 
communications privilege". Under the privilege, evidence in the form of "protected 
communications" is excluded in a "legal proceeding" unless the court grants leave to 
adduce it, and the party seeking to have it adduced has given notice of its intention.39 
The meaning of the phrase "evidence is not to be adduced in a legal proceeding", 
which opens s 32C, was examined in Atlas v DPP.40 In this case, the plaintiff, who 
faced allegations of nine counts of indecent assault contrary to s 68(3A) of the Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic) against J, had issued a subpoena to the Royal Melbourne Hospital, 
Melbourne Clinic (a psychiatric facility) and the Larundel Psychiatric Hospital to 
produce documents described as "medical file containing all medical reports, records, 
file notes and documents relating to (J)". The primary judge, Holt J, granted an order 
refusing the inspection of the documents. On appeal, Bongiorno J quashed Holt J's 
order, and ruled that the words in s 32C did not encompass the production of 
documents on subpoena because, according to his Honour:  
the phrase "adduced in a legal proceeding" is completely inapt to describe the 
production of documents to a court in response to a subpoena for production 
or, for that matter, the production of documents to a party for inspection 
following discovery (including pre-action or preliminary discovery, and 
significantly, third party discovery). Such documents are not necessarily 
brought forward for consideration by the tribunal of fact for the purpose 
described above. They are brought forward because of a legally enforceable 
command directed to the person in whose possession they are to produce them 
so that they can then be dealt with as directed by the court (or, in the case of 
discovery, by the rules  
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of court) in accordance with known legal principles, and subject to known 
legal safeguards.41 
In other words, according to Bongiorno J, the s 32C privilege does not prevent the 
accused person's lawyers from obtaining documents containing confidential 
communications by way of subpoena. What it does is to prevent their use directly 
within the court proceedings. It would have been preferable for the legislators to state 
in so many words that the exclusion was intended to cover pre-trial discovery and 
production.  
Limits on judicial discretion 
Under Victorian provisions, there is a negative presumption that evidence of protected 
communications will be excluded in a legal proceeding unless the court specifically 
grants leave to adduce it in whole or in part,42 and the party seeking to have it adduced 
has given notice of its intention.43 The legislation directs that "the court must not grant 
the leave to adduce protected evidence unless it is satisfied, on the balance of 
probabilities", of the probative value of the evidence sought to be adduced, and that 
"the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of confidential communications 
and protecting a protected confider from harm is substantially outweighed by the 
public interest in admitting, into evidence, evidence of substantial probative value".44  
 
In determining the public interest prerequisite the court must take into account "the 
likelihood, and the nature or extent, of harm that would be caused to the protected 
confider if the protected evidence is adduced".45 In Canada, for example, a risk of 
suicide by some of the complainants in response to a disclosure order was considered 
a factor to be taken into account in the balancing process under a similar provision.46 
The court must state reasons for its determination,47 and, where the leave to adduce 
evidence is refused, this fact must not be referred to in the presence of the jury, if 
any.48 In Atlas v DPP, Bongiorno J stated:  
The principle that all evidence should be available (subject to its meeting the 
statutory criteria set out in the new Victorian provisions where they apply) to 
enable the Court to discover the truth in the course of a trial is not inconsistent 
with the purpose of the amending legislation if it is given the scope I have 
allowed it.49 
 
Yet, under at least one interpretation of the far from clear judgment in Atlas, the 
public interest test has to be applied by the judge only when the defence seeks to use 
confidential communication material in evidence. The judge is not required to apply 
this test when a defence lawyer asks the court for access to confidential 
communications under subpoena.50 If this interpretation of Bongiorno J's ruling is 
right, a major purpose of the legislation is defeated, for, while disallowing the use of 
the actual confidential documents as evidence, it permits the defence to use 
information obtained from the documents "in less direct ways, such as when deciding 
what questions to ask the complainant in cross-examination".51 This is precisely the 
practice which the Attorney-General for Victoria, in her Second Reading Speech, 
labelled as akin to "fishing expeditions".  
The nature of protected communications 
The Victorian legislation extends protection to communications, oral or written, made 
in confidence to "a registered medical practitioner or counsellor in the course of the 
relationship of medical practitioner and patient or counsellor and client, as the case 
requires".52 Whereas "medical practitioner" is defined as a person registered under the 
Medical Practice Act 1994 (Vic), the qualifications of a "counsellor" are not 
specified. Since the term "treatment" is also left undefined under the Act, a 
"counsellor" can be a registered psychologist, a self-styled psychotherapist or, for that 
matter, a faith healer. Moreover, in both  
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Victoria and New South Wales the privilege attaches to communications made in 
confidence between the prescribed parties "whether before or after the acts 
constituting the offence occurred or are alleged to have occurred", that is, to quote the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, "regardless of whether the counselling 
relationship had any connection with the offence".53 
 
Since in Victoria and New South Wales, protected information is in the nature of a 
privilege, it can be adduced with the consent of the "protected confider". Victorian 
provisions specify that if the child-confider is under 14 years of age, the consent may 
be obtained from "any person whom the court regards as being an appropriate person 
to give that consent".54 
South Australia 
The scope of the public interest immunity 
In South Australia, communications relating to a victim or alleged victim of a sexual 
offence, "if made in a therapeutic context", are protected from disclosure in legal 
proceedings by public interest immunity.55 Unlike a privilege, the parties to the 
proceedings cannot waive public interest immunity. Indeed, s 67E(3) of the Evidence 
Act 1929 (SA) provides that communications protected by public interest immunity 
cannot be waived by the counsellor or therapist; a party to the protected 
communication; or the victim or alleged victim of the sexual offence or the guardian 
of the victim or alleged victim.  
Moreover, by virtue of s 67F(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), evidence considered 
to be part of protected communications "is entirely inadmissible in committal 
proceedings",56 and "is not liable to discovery or any other form of pre-trial 
disclosure",57 which means that a party who has custody of protected communications 
is not liable to produce that evidence in answer to a subpoena.58 According to the 
Supreme Court of South Australia, in Question of Law Reserved,59 by limiting the 
right to discovery of documents, the legislators have granted the makers of protected 
communications substantive as well as procedural statutory rights.60 
 
In Question of Law Reserved, the accused, who was charged with sexual abuse of six 
children, issued subpoenas requiring production from three hospitals in Adelaide of, 
amongst other things, clinical records of communications made in a therapeutic 
context by the children-complainants. The trial judge delivered a ruling in which he 
declined to inspect these documents, dismissed the application, and declined to allow 
the accused's counsel to inspect. Subsequently, he reserved for the consideration of 
the Court of Appeal several questions of law, including the issue of whether the right 
to statutory immunity had retrospective operation. While determining that it does not, 
Debelle and Lander JJ (Nyland J agreed with Lander J) analysed in depth the new 
legislative scheme.  
 
Lander J stressed that the public interest immunity, which attaches to protected 
communications, operates against all persons, including counsel and legal 
practitioners.61 His Honour noted that the policy of the legislation is to protect 
therapeutic communications relating to sexual assaults "from coming to the attention 
of anyone else apart from the parties to the communication".62 Such evidence "cannot 
be admitted in other legal proceedings unless the court gives leave to a party to the 
proceedings to adduce the evidence; and its admission is consistent with any 
limitations or restrictions fixed by the court".63 Pursuant to s 67F(2), a party has the 
right to apply to adduce evidence of the protected communication, but only if the 
applicant can satisfy the court that there is a legitimate forensic purpose for seeking 
leave to adduce the evidence and there is an arguable case that the evidence would 
materially assist the applicant in the presentation of the applicant's case. Counsel are 
not permitted to  
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inspect the evidence before the court makes any determination under s 67F(2).  
Judicial discretion 
Debelle J noted that it is unclear whether "a judge may inspect the documents for the 
purpose of determining whether the documents are in truth protected 
communications".64 Lander J stated, however, that "ordinarily the court could be 
satisfied upon evidence given either in affidavit or orally" whether the evidence was a 
protected communication. In rare cases of "any real doubt that the evidence came 
within a protected communication under s 67D then the court could … inspect the 
evidence for that purpose".65 In a further limitation of the court's discretion, s 67F(7) 
specifies:  
[T]he court is not to grant leave to adduce evidence of a protected 
communication unless satisfied that the public interest in preserving the 
confidentiality of protected communications is outweighed, in the 
circumstances of the case, by the public interest in preventing a miscarriage of 
justice that might arise from suppression of relevant evidence.  
Lander J commented:  
[T]he scheme of the Act will preclude some accused persons from ever 
becoming aware of protected communications which might be relevant to the 
accused's defence. But that, in my opinion, is the clear intent of the 
legislation.66 
The nature of protected communications 
In South Australia, the ambit of protection under "public interest immunity" only 
applies to communications made for the specific purpose of assessment of "the nature 
and severity of the trauma suffered by the victim or alleged victim, or consequent 
psychiatric, psychological or emotional harm", or "in or in the course of psychiatric or 
psychological therapy".67 Consequently, communi-cations made before the alleged 
offence had occurred are not covered. Moreover, there is no reference to medical 
practitioners; rather, the designated confidants are counsellors or therapists involved 
in the assessment of "psychiatric, psychological or emotional harm" or therapy for 
these conditions.68 Section 67D defines "counsellor or therapist" as "a person whose 
profession or work consists of, or includes, providing psychiatric or psychological 
therapy to victims of trauma (and includes a person who works voluntarily in that 
field)". At least with regard to psychiatric therapy or counselling, s 67D will need to 
be interpreted in the light of s 30 of the Medical Practitioners Act 1983 (SA), which 
provides that unless registered on the appropriate register or registers, it is illegal to 
hold oneself or another person out as a medical specialist.  
New South Wales 
Professional confidential relationship privilege and sexual assault communications 
privilege 
The Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) distinguishes between professional confidential 
relationship privilege (Div 1A), which aims to protect the integrity of such 
relationships, and the sexual assault communications privilege (Div 1B).69 For the 
purposes of both Divisions, protected communications are those made by a person in 
confidence to another person (called the confidant) "in the course of a relationship in 
which the confidant was acting in a professional capacity", and "when the confidant 
was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents".70 This will be 
so, "whether or not the obligation arises under law or can be inferred from the nature 
of the relationship between the person and the confidant".71 The legislation thus 
encompasses therapeutic relationships, although, given that the definition of "harm" 
includes any "actual physical bodily harm, financial loss, stress, shock, damage to 
reputation and emotional or psychological harm (such as shame, humiliation or 
fear)",72 just about any professional person in the community can come within the 
rubric of a "confidant".  
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Confusion regarding the nature and application of statutory professional confidential 
relationship privilege was illustrated in Mok v New South Wales Crime Commission.73 
In this case, the New South Wales Crime Commission brought civil proceedings74 
against Mok under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW). Section 6 of the 
Act provides for confiscation of property if the Supreme Court finds it to be more 
probable than not that the person has engaged in "serious crime-related activity". Mok 
wished to subpoena medical records of a man called Cheung who, whilst in prison in 
Victoria, sought treatment for psychiatric illnesses. Cheung was to give evidence in 
the confiscation proceedings against Mok. Sully J set aside the subpoena on the 
ground of public interest immunity as argued by the Victorian Department of Human 
Services (which has custody and control of prisoners' medical records). On appeal, 
Mason P set aside Sully J's order, noting that arguments regarding the common law 
public interest immunity and the case of R v Young (discussed below) did not address 
the true issues in this case. His Honour remitted the matter to be considered under 
professional confidential relationship privilege contained in Div 1 of the Evidence Act 
1995 in the first instance, and s 130 (exclusion of evidence of matters of state) in the 
second.75 
Procedural scope of the legislation 
Whereas in South Australia and Victoria the mischief of the misuse of judicial 
discretion has probably been cured, in New South Wales by virtue of s 126B(1) of the 
Evidence Act 1995, "the court may direct" that evidence of protected confidences not 
be adduced in a proceeding. In other words, under the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the 
evidence is to be adduced, unless the court decided otherwise. Under s 126B 
protection of confidences covered by professional confidential relationship privilege 
and sexual assault communications privilege applied to a "proceeding".  
 
The question whether this term should be interpreted as including production of 
documents on subpoena was discussed by the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
appeal in R v Young.76 In this case, the defendant, who was charged with sexual 
assault and indecent assault on the complainant, subpoenaed her clinical notes, 
records and files from a sexual assault service attached to the Tamworth Base 
Hospital, and from her psychiatrist. On appeal, the holdings of the District Court, that 
the sexual assault communications privilege applied derivatively to the production of 
the documents77 and that confidential sexual assault communications attracted public 
interest immunity under s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995, were reversed. The Court of 
Criminal Appeal distinguished disclosure of communications by way of ancillary 
process such as subpoena from adducing of evidence in a courtroom in the course of a 
hearing.78 The majority refused to extend the meaning of the words "adduced in a 
proceeding"79 to "embrace production [of documents] pursuant to a subpoena".80 
Judicial discretion 
The justices were less than impressed with the drafting of the statutory privilege 
provisions, and in an appendix to the judgment, drafted their own model version of 
what the legislation should state.81 Subsequent to R v Young, the Parliament of New 
South Wales set out to rectify drafting faults in the original statute.  
In his Second Reading Speech on the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual 
Assault Communications Privilege) Bill,82 the Attorney General for New South Wales 
declared that: 
"the Government [had] always intended that the sexual assault 
communications privilege should be capable of application in appropriate 
cases at all stages of the trial process".83  
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The Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), Pt 7, now provides that "a person who 
objects to production of a document recording a protected confidence on the ground 
that it is privileged cannot be required (whether by subpoena or any other procedure) 
to produce the document for inspection by a party" in any criminal proceedings unless 
the document is first produced for inspection by the court for the purposes of ruling 
on the objection. In order to grant leave, the court has to be satisfied (whether on 
inspection of the document or at some later stage in the proceedings) that the 
document has "substantial probative value", and that "the public interest in preserving 
the confidentiality of protected confidences and protecting the principal protected 
confider from harm is substantially outweighed by the public interest in allowing 
inspection of the document".84 In relation to criminal proceedings, the balancing of 
the public interests provision is now essentially the same in all three jurisdictions. 
However, in Victoria it is only applied at the actual proceedings stage, in New South 
Wales the judge is required to consider the balance of interests in relation to pre-trial 
criminal proceedings, whereas in South Australia the balancing requirement operates 
in civil discovery or in any other form of pre-trial disclosure procedure, as well as in 
committal proceedings.  
 
Victoria and New South Wales employ the "substantial probative value" test. With 
regard to this test, James J in R v Young pointed out:  
"Probative value" and "substantial probative value" are concepts which are 
appropriate to evidence which is being adduced but much less appropriate to 
the contents of a document which has been subpoenaed. A document which 
has been subpoenaed may be of substantial forensic value to a party who 
issued the subpoena, for example by indicating a line of enquiry, even though 
it is inadmissible and therefore, presumably, has no "probative value".85 
 
The problem with the wording of the test was addressed by South Australian 
legislators, who drafted s 67F(2) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), to provide:  
[O]n an application for leave to adduce evidence of a protected 
communication, the judge may make a preliminary examination of the 
relevant evidence if satisfied that the applicant has a legitimate forensic 
purpose for seeking leave to adduce the evidence.  
 
In Question of Law Reserved, the accused person's counsel argued that leave to 
inspect the counselling files should be granted on the grounds that they may contain 
material which would cast doubt on the truthfulness or accuracy of the prosecution 
witnesses whose evidence was largely uncorroborated, and the accuracy of whose 
memories might have been affected by the counselling. The Supreme Court of South 
Australia found that those grounds "could not have satisfied the Court that there was a 
legitimate forensic purpose for seeking leave to adduce the evidence".86 
Application of the privilege in civil and criminal proceedings 
The Bill to overcome the decision of R v Young also amended the Evidence Act 1995 
(NSW), by virtue of which the sexual assault communications privilege applies in "a 
civil proceeding in which substantially the same acts are in issue as the acts that were 
in issue in relation to a criminal proceeding".87 Therefore, "[I]f evidence was found to 
be privileged in a criminal proceeding under Pt 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
1986 (NSW), the evidence may not be adduced in a civil proceeding." Though 
motivated by the best of intentions, these statutory requirements might have the effect 
of entrenching the old common law rule known as the "felonious tort rule", whereby a 
plaintiff who has been a victim of a criminal offence committed by the defendant is 
precluded from obtaining compensation in civil courts "unless the defendant [had] 
been prosecuted or a reasonable excuse [had] been shewn for his not having been 
prosecuted". Victoria and Tasmania88 have abolished this rule, and in Williams v 
Spautz,89 Deane J observed that modern courts tend to treat this common law rule as 
"archaic".  
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The nature of protected counselling communication privilege 
The Attorney General for New South Wales,90 in the course of his Second Reading 
Speech on the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill, emphasised that the legislation 
should address yet another issue arising out of the R v Young decision, namely, a very 
narrow interpretation of what constitutes a protected counselling communication. He 
stated:  
[P]otential access by defendants to the views of others involved in the process 
of sexual assault counselling – such as the counsellor's responses to a 
protected confider, or observations or treatment details concerning a protected 
confider communicated between counsellors who are concerned with the same 
case – will result in the therapeutic basis for the counselling being undermined 
in just the same way as if the protected confider's own ruminations were 
accessible.  
 
Consequently, the definition of "counselling communication" in the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) is defined in s 148(4)(a) as a communication made in 
confidence by the counselled person to the counsellor in the course of a relationship in 
which the counsellor is counselling, giving therapy to or treating the counselled 
person for any emotional or psychological condition.91 The term "counselling 
communication" also encompasses communications made in confidence  
to or about the counselled person by the counsellor in the course of that relationship, 
or made in confidence about the counselled person by a counsellor or a parent, carer 
or other supportive person who is present to facilitate communication between the 
counselled person and the counsellor or to otherwise further the counselling process,92 
as well as communications made in confidence by or to the counsellor by another 
counsellor or by a person who is or had counselled or otherwise treated the counselled 
person for any emotional or psychological condition of the person.93 
 
The nature of "protected confidences" and the ambit of "counselling communication" 
defined in s 148(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) was examined in R 
v Lee,94 a case which involved the claim of sexual assault communication privilege in 
relation to a subpoena issued in proceedings in which the accused was charged with 
five counts of indecent assault on a person under the age of 16 years (the confidant) 
by a person in authority. The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal found that 
the relationship between the confidant and the social worker at Mission Australia to 
whom she spoke about the provision of temporary accommodation, and who arranged 
for her to have counselling with other persons, as well as listening to accounts of her 
visits to those other persons, amounted to the social worker "look[ing] after her in a 
general way, but not in a way which fell within s 148(4)(a)".95 The ruling of the trial 
judge that Mission Australia was not obliged to produce the documents for inspection 
thus was reversed.  
 
In R v Young, R v Lee and Atlas v DPP, the judges were very critical of the admittedly 
sloppy drafting of the statutory privilege in their respective jurisdictions. They also 
cavilled the curtailment of discretionary powers regarding the inspection of 
documents and the shift in the procedural rights enjoyed by the parties. Thus, in R v 
Lee, Heydon J, speaking for the court, described as "an initial difficulty" the fact that:  
the primary judge had nothing before him apart from the subpoena and the 
documents which the subpoena caught. Neither the Crown nor the defendant 
had access to those documents and the solicitor appearing for the complainant 
and the complainant had access to them only briefly. Counsel for the 
defendant did, in the argument before the primary judge, quote from the 
complainant's statement to the police on 24 July 1999, but no evidence was 
formally tendered.96 
His Honour went on to state:  
Plainly, the primary judge could not have proceeded as he did, given the lack 
of evidence before him, without inspecting the documents. This Court has had 
to adopt the same course. It is unsatisfactory but inevitable that the Court lacks  
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full assistance from counsel for the defendant in these circumstances.97 
 
The justices of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal chose to interpret the 
privilege provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) very narrowly. One 
of the reasons for the narrow reading of the privilege was provided by Wood CJ at CL 
in R v Mailes.98 Wood CJ referred to the principle that "legislation is presumed not to 
alter common law doctrines, or to invade common law rights, especially those of a 
person accused of crime".99 The concern for the rights of the accused echoes the 
following remarks of James J in R v Young, made in the context of common law 
public interest immunity:100  
[T]here is only one common law in Australia and it is not legitimate to rely on 
the New South Wales Evidence Act as a basis for changing the common law 
by creating a new category of public interest immunity. Any new category of 
public interest immunity consisting of confidential sexual assault 
communications would operate especially, if not exclusively, in criminal 
proceedings so as to diminish the rights of criminal accused.  
Conclusion 
In the three Australian jurisdictions where the right of the accused to have access to 
material which could potentially be of assistance in defending a charge of sexual 
assault has been statutorily restricted, the judicial response to the changes has varied. 
While some judges support the statutory changes, others have found them wanting, or 
difficult to accept. In general, however, it is arguable that, in a democratic society, 
where values espoused by the wider community – as reflected in legislation – shift the 
common law procedural and substantive balance of rights between the parties through 
a recognition of an exclusionary privilege, it is incumbent upon the courts to be 
prepared to sacrifice, in some measure, their ability to inquire into all material facts.101  
 
This said, it is a great pity that the Victorian and the New South Wales statutes have 
not been drafted with more focus and precision. In particular, to fulfil its function as a 
safeguard of confidentiality, the privilege should extend to all pre-trial discovery and 
production. Its ambit, however, should be confined to confidential communications 
that occur within a therapeutic relationship initiated following the sexual assault.  
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